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PLURALISM APPLIED: A CONCORDANT 
APPROACH TO SELECTING CONTRACT 
RULES 
SAMUEL F. ERNST* 
Contract rules can be justified by utilitarian theories (such as efficiency 
theory), which are concerned with promoting rules that enhance societal wealth 
and utility.  Contract rules can also be justified by rights-based theories (such 
as promissory and reliance theories), which are concerned with protecting the 
contractual freedom and interests of the individual parties to the contract.  Or, 
contract rules can be analyzed through the lenses of a host of other theories, 
including critical legal theory, bargain theory, and so on.  Because no single, 
unitary theory can ever explain the complex body of laws and societal 
conventions surrounding contracts, the best rule to govern any particular 
situation is the one that can be justified by multiple normative theories.  Such 
an approach would stand the best chance of achieving consensus, and would 
acknowledge the insight of pluralism theorists—that no single unified theory 
can explain the civil law.  This Article applies a concordant approach to 
selecting contract rules to address the question of whether a parent company 
should be held liable in tort for directing the termination of a contract entered 
into by its subsidiary. 
Under ordinary circumstances, a simple breach of contract does not give 
rise to tort liability and punitive damages; one cannot tortiously interfere with 
one’s own contract.  But the courts around the country are deeply divided on 
the question of whether parent companies are immune from tort liability for 
inducing a subsidiary to breach a contract.  Some courts hold that because the 
parent and subsidiary share common interests, the parent is completely immune 
from tort liability, just as though it were a party to the contract (Category 1).  
Some courts take the similarly formalistic approach that because the parent 
and subsidiary are technically separate entities, the parent enjoys no immunity 
from tort liability (Category 2).  Some courts impose tort liability only if the 
parent acted against the business interests of the parent and subsidiary or 
committed an independent tort (Category 3).  Some courts impose tort liability 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law.  Thanks to my research assistant, 
Griffin Schindler.  Thanks to the following scholars who commented on this Article: Professors Kevin 
Lapp, Erez Aloni, Monica M. Todd, David S. Han, Rachel E. VanLandingham, and Sung Eun. 
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even if the breach of contract was in the business interest of the parent and 
subsidiary if the parent company’s actions were “wrongful,” which can be 
something less than tortious behavior (Category 4). 
This Article presents an exhaustive survey and categorization of these 
conflicting rules and then applies normative contract theory to determine which 
is the best approach.  In particular, the two most dominant contract law 
theories of our time are applied to the issue: efficiency theory and rights-based 
theory.   
Applying efficiency theory to the problem at hand, this Article begins with 
the proposition that, in order to facilitate efficient breaches of contract, no tort 
liability should be imposed.  However, once one takes into account the 
underlying false assumption of efficiency theory that commercial actors always 
act rationally, allowing for tort liability to be imposed in those situations where 
the parent does not act out of business judgment makes sense. 
When rights-based theory is applied to this issue, it raises questions as to 
whether breach should be penalized to honor the promise made to the non-
breaching party and to protect the non-breaching party’s reliance on that 
promise.  However, rights-based theory would also argue for protecting the 
parent company’s autonomy by allowing it to reject a promise it never accepted 
and to decline to honor reliance it never induced—but only if the parent is 
acting out of rational business interest.  Accordingly, the parent company 
should be afforded autonomy in choosing to terminate a contract it did not 
bargain for (so long as it pays compensatory damages).  If the parent 
company’s actions are not taken for rational business reasons, but rather for 
reasons of spite, malice, or oppression, then the law should punish and deter 
such behavior.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
One cannot tortiously interfere with one’s own contract.1  Rather, according 
to the Restatement of Torts, only “[o]ne who intentionally and improperly 
interferes with the performance of a contract . . . between another and a third 
person” is liable in tort for causing a breach of contract.2  This stands to reason 
in a society grounded in freedom of contract because “along with the celebrated 
freedom to make contracts goes a considerable freedom to break them as well.”3  
Accordingly, courts do not generally punish or make an example of parties who 
breach a contract through the award of punitive damages.4  The breaching party 
should be ordered to compensate the victim of the breach for the harm caused 
 
1. See Knickman v. Midland Risk Servs.–Ill., Inc., 700 N.E.2d 458, 461–62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) 
(“Plaintiff does not dispute the basic rule that an entity cannot be liable in tort for interfering with its 
own contract.”). 
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (emphasis added). 
3. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1, at 756 (3d ed. 1999). 
4. See id. § 12.8, at 787 n.17 (alteration in original) (citing Addis v. Gramophone Co. [1909] AC 
488 (HL) 494 (appeal taken from Eng.) (“[D]amages for breach of contract [are] in the nature of 
compensation, not punishment.”)). 
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by the broken promise,5 but society does not seek to punish and deter breach of 
contract in the same way that it seeks to punish and deter torts.6 
This black letter rule can be justified by two dominant theories of contract 
law: efficiency theory and rights-based theory.7 
Efficiency theory generally addresses problems in contract law by asking 
which solution increases overall social welfare by resulting in the most efficient 
use of resources and an increase in societal wealth.8  Efficiency theorists argue 
 
5. Such compensation can take various forms.  It can be compensation for the victim’s expected 
gains under the contract (expectation damages), compensation for the victim’s expenses incurred in 
reliance on the contract (reliance damages), or disgorgement of value the victim has given to the 
breaching party pursuant to the contract (restitution damages), plus any consequential damages caused 
by the breach.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (Purposes 
of Remedies); id. § 347 (Measure of Damages in General); id. § 349 (Damages Based on Reliance 
Interest); see also L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 
46 YALE L.J. 52, 53–54 (1936) (discussing the restitution interest, the reliance interest, and the 
expectation interest). 
6. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.8, at 787 (“No matter how reprehensible the breach, 
damages are generally limited to those required to compensate the injured party for lost expectation, 
for it is a fundamental tenet of the law of contract remedies that an injured party should not be put in a 
better position than had the contract been performed.”). 
7. Stephen A. Smith explains that normative contract law theories can be divided into utilitarian 
theories, which justify contract rules as serving society generally, and rights-based theories, which 
justify contract rules as upholding the rights of the individual parties to a contract.  STEPHEN A. SMITH, 
CONTRACT THEORY 106–07 (2004).  According to Smith, the “best known and most important group 
of utilitarian justifications of contract law” are efficiency theories.  Id. at 107.  Among rights-based 
theories, Smith posits that the dominant theories are promissory theory, reliance theory, and transfer 
theory, but that promissory theory is the most ‘orthodox’ and “provide[s] the best answer to the analytic 
question” of how to describe the justification for particular contract rules.  Id. at 142–43, 142 n.48.  For 
the purpose of this Article, I discuss rights-based theory as a general concept, but focus primarily on 
promissory theory and reliance theory.  Different terminology and categories are also available and 
can be quite useful.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
269, 271–91 (1986); SMITH, supra at 142 n.48 (dividing contract law theories into “party-based” 
theories (comprised of will and reliance theories), “standards-based” theories (comprised of efficiency 
and fairness theories), process-based theories (comprised of the bargain theory of consideration), and 
Barnett’s own “consent-based” theory (which he describes as a rights-based theory and which Stephen 
A. Smith cites to as a transfer theory)).  According to Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, on the other 
hand, the world is divided up into efficiency and autonomy theory (which appears to be a term for 
rights-based theories).  Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 543 n.1 (2003).  For convenience, this Article generally employs Stephen A. 
Smith’s terminology. 
8. SMITH, supra note 7, at 107.  Robert A. Hillman refers to this variety of efficiency theory as 
“‘neoclassical’ law and economics,” to be distinguished with a more recent efficiency theory that 
focuses on “transaction costs and their effect on choice of contract governance structures.”  ROBERT 
A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY 
THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 214 & n.9 (Aulis Aarnio et al. eds., 1997) (quoting Ian R. Macneil, 
Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a “Rich Classificatory 
Apparatus,” 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1018, 1022 (1981)). 
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that greater wealth or utility will sometimes result if a party breaches a contract 
than if the contractual promise is fulfilled.9  This happens when the gains to be 
made under an alternative contract (or through no contract at all) will be greater 
than the cost of compensating the victim of the breach for the harm to its 
expectation under the contract.10  It follows that efficiency theory favors a rule 
against punitive damages for a simple breach of contract.11  Punitive damages 
would deter these “efficient breaches” and result in a waste of the wealth and 
utility they would otherwise create.12 
Unlike efficiency theory, which is primarily concerned with how contract 
law can promote social welfare, rights-based theory views contract law as 
protecting the rights of the individual parties to the contract.13  In particular, 
contract law should protect the right of individuals to bind themselves through 
contracts (i.e., freedom of contract) by enforcing the promises enshrined in 
contracts, or by protecting the reliance interest individuals have in contracts.14  
The pioneer of the promissory theory of contracts, Charles Fried, wrote that 
“[t]he obligation to keep a promise is grounded not in arguments of utility but 
in respect for individual autonomy and in trust.”15  It follows that if a party 
breaks a contractual promise, the only way to protect freedom of contract is for 
the law to enforce that promise; the breaching party “should be made to hand 
over the equivalent of the promised performance.”16  The appropriate remedy 
for breach of contract is expectation damages because “[t]he expectation 
standard gives the victim of a breach no more or less than he would have had 
had there been no breach—in other words, he gets the benefit of his bargain.”17  
Fried explains why damages for breach of contract should be no less than 
compensatory damages under a rights-based theory.18   
 
9. See John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 277, 291 (1972); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic 
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 291–92 (1970).  
10. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 151 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 8th ed. 
2011). 
11. SMITH, supra note 7, at 418. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 107. 
14. As noted above, Smith divides rights-based theories into three major categories: promissory 
theory, reliance theory, and transfer theory.  See supra note 7.  This Article will focus on promissory 
theory and reliance theory. 
15. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 16 
(1981). 
16. Id. at 17. 
17. Id. (emphasis added). 
18. See id. at 17–27. 
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Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz complete the picture by explaining 
why a rights-based theory of contract counsels against supra-compensatory 
damages for breach of contract, such as punitive damages.19  Markovits and 
Schwartz hypothesize that a contract is a dual promise: “either to trade goods 
or services to buyers or to make a monetary transfer to buyers, equal to the 
value the buyers would realize from receiving the goods or services [i.e., an 
expectation value].”20  It follows that compensatory, expectation damages are 
favored over supra-compensatory, punitive damages because they do not 
impose an obligation greater than what the contracting parties agreed to and 
thereby protect the breaching party’s freedom of contract.21 
Hence, there are strong theoretical arguments across dueling theories of 
contract law to justify the old chestnut of a principal that there are no punitive 
damages for a simple breach of contract.22  And it follows from this that one 
cannot tortiously interfere with one’s own contract.23  Breach of contract is 
permitted, not punished.24 
But what of the more complicated situation where a parent company directs 
its wholly owned subsidiary to breach a contract?  This might happen for a 
variety of reasons.  When a parent acquires a subsidiary, the subsidiary brings 
with it various baggage, some good, some bad, including ongoing contractual 
obligations with other companies.  The parent may seek to terminate the 
contract for legitimate, business related reasons.  For example, the parent may 
be able to negotiate better terms with a different supplier, or may be able to 
satisfy the contract needs internally.  On the other end of the spectrum, the 
parent may terminate a subsidiary’s contract out of personal malice or spite 
 
19. Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Expectation Remedy and the Promissory Basis of 
Contract, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 799, 811 (2012). 
20. Id. at 808. 
21. Id. at 811. 
22. There is a more recent body of scholarship questioning this first principal of contract law.  
Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz note that “[a] growing chorus of increasingly prominent critics 
argues against limiting contract remedies to vindicating a disappointed promisee’s contractual 
expectations.”  Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 805–06 (citing Richard R.W. Brooks, The 
Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568 (2006); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual 
Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 
93 CAL. L. REV. 975 (2005); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 559 (2006); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1989); Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551 (2009); Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007)).  
Grappling with this questioning of first principals is beyond the scope of this Article, which takes as a 
given premise that contract law does and should seek to compensate, rather than punish, a simple 
breach of contract. 
23. See Knickman v. Midland Risk Servs.–Ill., Inc., 700 N.E.2d 458, 461–62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
24. FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 12.8, at 787.  
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toward the victim of the breach, even if doing so is not in the best interest of 
the shareholders.  Somewhere in between is the situation where a parent 
acquires a subsidiary for the purpose of terminating the subsidiary’s contracts 
with competitors of the parent.  Once the acquisition is made, this would appear 
to be in the business interest of the parent and subsidiary.  To the extent such 
behavior harms competition, it would presumably be in the realm of antitrust 
law to deter such behavior.  Is it nonetheless a tort that courts should punish 
under a theory of intentional interference with contract? 
The courts are deeply divided on these questions, with conflicting views 
among the states’ highest courts and among the federal courts of appeals 
applying state law.25  Part II of this Article analyzes notable rulings from around 
the country to arrive at the conclusion that there are at least four different 
approaches to the question of whether and when a parent company may 
terminate the contract of a subsidiary. 
A. Category 1 Cases: Absolute Immunity 
Some courts hold that because the parent and subsidiary share common 
interests, the parent is, in practical effect, a party to the contract and should 
enjoy complete immunity from tort liability.  I refer to these cases as Category 
1 cases.26 
B. Category 2 Cases: Absolute Liability 
Other courts adhere to the formalistic rule that because the companies are 
technically separate, a parent enjoys no protection from such tort liability.  This 
Article refers to this technical, black letter approach as Category 2.27   
C. Category 3 Cases: The Rational Business Interest Approach 
A third group of cases apply the rule that the parent is immune from tortious 
interference with contract if it is acting in the business interest of the parent and 
subsidiary companies in terminating the contract at issue and if it does not 
commit an independent tort.  Under this rule, if the parent acts out of irrational 
malice or personal animus toward the victim of the breach in a manner that is 
against the business interests of the parent and subsidiary, it should be punished.  
But if the parent company directs the termination of a subsidiary’s contract for 
rational business reasons, then it is not liable in tort unless, of course, its actions 
 
25. See infra Part II. 
26. See infra Section II.A. 
27. See infra Section II.B. 
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constitute an independent tort (such as fraud).  I refer to these cases as Category 
3 cases.28   
D. Category 4 Cases: The Multi-Factored Approach 
And then there is California, the pioneer of Category 4 cases.  California 
cases provide that “the privilege of a parent or subsidiary corporation to 
interfere with the contractual relationship of the other ‘is at most a qualified one 
dependent for its existence upon the circumstances of the case.’”29  California 
cases require parent companies to prove two elements in order to enjoy 
immunity for directing the termination of a subsidiary’s contract: that the parent 
“(a) does not employ improper means, and (b) acts to protect his interest from 
being prejudiced by the relation.”30  Hence, even if a parent acts in the best 
business interest of the parent and subsidiary in terminating a subsidiary 
contract, tort liability will still lie if the parent uses “improper means.”  
Improper means is not explicitly defined.  Unlike with Category 3 cases, 
improper means can be something less than an independent tort and less than a 
violation of the antitrust laws.  I refer to these cases as Category 4 cases.31   
The vagueness of Category 4 cases arises from the fact that the standard 
emerges out of the multi-factored test provided by Section 767 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, entitled “Factors in Determining Whether 
Interference is Improper.”32  That section does not address the situation of a 
parent and subsidiary company, but considers a variety of non-exclusive factors 
to determine if any actor’s intentional interference with a contract is improper, 
including “the relations between the parties.”33  Courts following this approach 
 
28. See infra Section II.C. 
29. GHK Assocs. v. Mayer Group, Inc., 274 Cal. Rptr. 168, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Culcal Stylco, Inc. v. Vornado, Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421–22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)). 
30. Asahi Kasei Pharma Corp. v. Actelion Ltd., 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 689, 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) 
(quoting Sade Shoe Co. v. Oschin & Snyder, 209 Cal. Rptr. 124, 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (AM. LAW INST. 1939))). 
31. See infra Section II.D. 
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
33. Id.  The Section provides as follows: 
In determining whether an actor’s conduct in intentionally interfering with a 
contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or not, 
consideration is given to the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, 
(b) the actor’s motive, 
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, 
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, 
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the 
contractual interests of the other, 
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caution that the parent-subsidiary relationship is but one factor, which does not 
preclude consideration of the other six factors that are listed in the 
Restatement.34  Because these other factors include such things as “the nature 
of the actor’s conduct” and “the actor’s motive,” the parent can be liable even 
if it acted out of business judgment and even if its actions were not 
independently tortious, merely because its behavior is adjudged “improper.”35 
E. The Concordant Approach to Applied Normative Contract Theory 
Which of these four legal rules is justified by normative contract law 
theory?  Such a question is exceedingly complicated because no single theory 
of contracts can explain or justify all of the conflicting rules and societal 
conventions of contracts.36  As Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott observe, 
“Contract law has neither a complete descriptive theory, explaining what the 
law is, nor a complete normative theory, explaining what the law should be.”37   
For example, among the categories of contract theories are utilitarian 
theories, which describe and advocate for contract rules that benefit society as 
a whole, rather than the individual parties to the contract.38  Most prominent 
among utilitarian theories are efficiency theories, which focus on enhancing the 
overall wealth and utility of society’s resources.39  But even among efficiency 
theories there are different approaches.  Traditional efficiency theory maintains 
that contract law should facilitate voluntary exchanges that result in transferring 
resources to where they have the highest value.40  More recent, efficiency theory 
focuses on which contract rules reduce transaction costs in the allocation of 
resources.41 
Another group of contract law theories are rights-based theories, which 
describe and advocate for contract law rules that protect the autonomy and 
 
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference and 
(g) the relations between the parties. 
Id.  
34. See Paramount Farms Int’l, L.L.C. v. Ventilex B.V., 2016-Ohio-1150, 61 N.E.3d 702, at ¶ 
39 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)). 
35. See infra Section II.D. 
36. HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 2 (“[N]o unitary theory adequately captures the entire contract-
law field.”). 
37. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 543. 
38. SMITH, supra note 7, at 106–07. 
39. Id. at 107. 
40. HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 214 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
10–11 (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992)).  Hillman refers to this approach as “‘neo-classical’ 
law and economics.”  Id.  
41. Id. at 214 n.9 (citing Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance 
of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 233–34 (1979)). 
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interests of the individual parties to the contract.42  Even among these theorists 
there is a debate as to whether contract rules should primarily protect the 
sanctity of the promise,43 the reliance interest created by the contract,44 the 
individual interest in the transfer of rights created by the contract,45 or all of 
these in addition to other interests depending on the contract rule in question.46 
Beyond these two categories of contract theory, there are many others.  For 
example, this brief account has not considered the dominant “bargain theory” 
of the nineteenth century that grounded contract law in the exchange of 
consideration.47  Nor does this Article consider an important theory that 
emerged in the late twentieth century: Critical Legal Studies, which argues that 
contract law is indeterminate, inconsistent, and subjective.48  In the guise of an 
objective system of rules, contract law serves only to maintain existing power 
relations and the unfair distribution of wealth to the elites in society.49 
In the face of this cacophony of theories,50 one is tempted to embrace the 
realism of Critical Legal Theory and conclude that the choice of any particular 
rule will be a grab for power clothed in the guise of a unifying theory.  Doing 
so does not assist in the practical task of determining which of several available 
contract rules is preferable for a given situation; it is, rather, a rejection of the 
possibility of objectivity for the good of the public or the protection of the 
parties to a case.  This insight may or may not be correct.  Either way, it does 
not help with the task of selecting a rule. 
Another approach would be to justify one particular theory as the best 
theory and then apply that theory.  Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that lawyers 
confront a vast body of common law going back hundreds of years from many 
jurisdictions.51  Holmes called these past decisions “the oracles of the law,” 
 
42. SMITH, supra note 7, at 140. 
43. See generally FRIED, supra note 15, at 7–27. 
44. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 54. 
45. See Barnett, supra note 7, at 319. 
46. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). 
47. Barnett, supra note 7, at 287 (citing A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF 
CONTRACT 316 (1975)); see GILMORE, supra note 46, at 13–18.  
48. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 462, 470 (1987). 
49. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT: 
ANOTHER TIME, A GREATER TASK 121 (2015); Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of 
Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917, 953–56 (1974).  
50. There are other theories that have not been mentioned.  For example, Hillman also discusses 
contextualism and neoformalism.  HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 125–71.  As another example, Smith 
discusses additional utilitarian theories, such as promoting distributive justice, promoting valuable 
relationships, or promoting autonomy.  SMITH, supra note 7, at 136–39. 
51. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897). 
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because “[i]n these sibylline leaves are gathered the scattered prophecies of the 
past upon the cases in which the axe will fall.”52  In light of these circumstances, 
Holmes felt that “[f]ar the most important and pretty nearly the whole meaning 
of every new effort of legal thought is to make these prophecies more precise, 
and to generalize them into a thoroughly connected system.”53  But this 
approach is both impossible and unsatisfactory.  It is impossible because the 
many rules of contract law cannot be reconciled into a thoroughly connected 
system.  And if we select a unitary theory to justify one rule or the other, then 
we will not satisfy adherents of the host of other theories, that we have selected 
the proper rule. 
This is why Hanoch Dagan writes that “[t]he lure of private law monism 
can and should be resisted.”54  Instead of clinging stubbornly to one particular 
theory, “[p]rivate law theory should take seriously the existing structural 
pluralism of private law and celebrate, rather than suppress (as variations on a 
common theme) or marginalize (as peripheral exceptions to a robust core), the 
multiple forms typifying private law.”55  In another article, Dagan applies his 
structural pluralism to describe contract law as “an umbrella for diverse contract 
institutions, which stand for diverse ideals of the various types of social 
relationships and economic functions contracts serve.”56   
Robert A. Hillman also insists that “no unitary theory adequately captures 
the entire contract-law field,” and argues that this demonstrates the richness of 
contract law rather than the cynical gathering of power to elites (as critical legal 
theorists might argue).57  Hillman “emphasize[s] contract law’s richness and 
importance and question[s] the utility of overly abstract unitary theories.”58  
Hillman writes that contract law largely succeeds in “suitably promot[ing] the 
formation and enforcement of private arrangements and ensures some degree 
of fairness in the exchange process,” but not because it can be explained by a 
single unifying theory.59  Rather, “contract law largely succeeds because it is 
 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 457–58. 
54. Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 
1411 (2012). 
55. Id. at 1411–12 (alteration in original). 
56. Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 19, 37 (2013).  Erez Aloni has done important work applying structural pluralism in the area 
of family law.  Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 317, 317 
(2016). 
57. HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 2. 
58. Id. at xiii. 
59. Id. at 2. 
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the product of the legal system’s reasonable and practical compromises over 
conflicting values and interests.”60 
The pluralism of scholars, such as Dagan and Hillman, is largely an attempt 
to explain existing law.  Can pluralism be applied in a normative way to assist 
in selecting a particular rule among several options?  An alternative approach 
to applying one particular normative contract theory is to attempt to select the 
rule that is justified by multiple contract law theories.  Such an approach 
recognizes the insight of pluralism, that private law is an institution that 
represents a compromise between diverse interests and values in a diverse 
society, and seeks to select the rule that thereby has the best chance of achieving 
consensus.61  I call this the “concordant approach” to applied normative theory.  
Elsewhere I have argued that in selecting among rules to govern patent law, one 
should err on the side of selecting a rule that favors innovation and competition 
over the patent monopoly, because this approach is supported by multiple 
dominant patent law theories: disclosure theory, commercialization theory, 
prospect theory, patent race theory, and signaling theory.62 
This Article applies the concordant approach to this issue of contract law 
discussed above: When should a parent company be liable in tort for interfering 
with the contract of a subsidiary company?  Rather than selecting between a 
utilitarian approach and a rights-based approach, this Article analyzes the 
question under the dominant theories from each school of thought: efficiency 
theory, promissory theory, and reliance theory.  Passing the various rules 
through the filter of utilitarian and rights-based considerations makes sense 
because, to quote Robert C. Clark, “A good society depends on both autonomy 
and heteronomy, each present in large measure.”63 
F. Efficiency Theory Applied 
Part III of this Article applies efficiency theory to the question of when a 
parent company should be liable in tort for interfering with the contract of a 
subsidiary company.  In order to facilitate efficient breaches of contract, a 
parent company should generally be privileged to direct its subsidiary to 
 
60. Id. 
61. See Dagan, supra note 54, at 1421–22. 
62. Samuel F. Ernst, Protecting the Boundaries: Unclaimed Consideration in the Patentee’s 
Social Contract, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 12–26 (2015). 
63. Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1726 (1989).  Robert A. Hillman’s work lends support to a concordance 
approach.  Hillman writes, “Contract law is complex, contradictory, and, ultimately, inconclusive on 
what the relationship of these [contract theory] principles is and should be.  Moreover, by ignoring or 
downplaying counter-principles and theories, some theorists camouflage contract’s complexity and 
hence disguise its true nature.”  HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 7. 
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terminate a contract.  If the parent and subsidiary companies will profit more 
from a substitute contract or from no contract at all than they would from 
fulfilling the contract, then society should not punish the parent for directing 
the breach of contract so long as it compensates the victim of the breach for its 
expectation damages.64   
A principal criticism of efficiency theory is that it rests on the questionable 
assumption that commercial actors act rationally in the interest of the 
business.65  In fact, people often act against their economic self-interest due to 
a range of factors, including: social conventions and pressure, altruism, 
misinformation, and risk aversion or attraction.66  Alan Schwartz and Robert E. 
Scott argue that this criticism is less valid in the context of contracts between 
companies, like the contracts discussed in this Article, than it is with respect to 
contracts involving individuals.67  Schwartz and Scott argue that companies 
generally act to maximize wealth because they are directed by shareholders, 
whose principal incentive is to maximize profits.68  But even if we accept that 
in the vast majority of cases parent companies will only terminate subsidiary 
contracts for rational, business reasons, it makes sense to have an exception 
imposing tort liability in those (perhaps rare) situations where parent companies 
act irrationally out of malice or personal animus or when they commit an 
independent tort (such as fraud). 
Accordingly, the rule of the Category 3 cases makes the most sense from 
the perspective of efficiency theory.  Category 1 cases fail to punish and deter 
those breaches of contract that are economically inefficient or that implicate the 
promissory and reliance rights of the promisee.  Category 2 cases punish and 
deter all breaches of contract directed by the parent company, and thus result in 
preventing many efficient breaches.  Category 4 cases punish and deter many 
breaches that are in the business interest of the parent and subsidiary, where the 
parent company is perceived to be acting “improperly,” as defined by the vague 
and largely irrelevant factors set forth in the Restatement of Torts.69  Only 
 
64. See infra Part III. 
65. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
43, 52 (1993); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 307 (1984). 
66. Cf. Samuel F. Ernst, Patent Exhaustion for the Exhausted Defendant: Should Parties be Able 
to Contract Around Exhaustion in Settling Patent Litigation?, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 445, 
469–70 (2014) (explaining that parties do not act out of rational self-interest in settling litigation). 
67. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 550. 
68. Id. at 550–51. 
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see also infra Section 
II.D. 
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Category 3 cases allow the parent to induce efficient breaches of contract, while 
punishing the parent for irrational or independently tortious behavior.70 
G. Rights-Based Theory Applied 
Part IV of this Article argues that the category 2 approach is also justified 
by rights-based promissory and reliance theories.  Promissory theory protects 
the freedom of individuals to enter into contracts by enforcing contractual 
promises.71  But in order to protect individual autonomy, promissory theory 
recognizes that contractual promises should only be respected if they are 
voluntary on both sides.72  Accordingly, as a general proposition, promissory 
theory would advocate that a parent company should not be bound by a contract 
that it never entered into and that is now against the business interest of the 
parent company and its newly acquired subsidiary.   
Similarly, reliance theory posits that contractual promises should be 
respected to protect the reliance interests of the parties to a contract.73  However, 
it is only fair to force a party to respect another’s reliance interest if that party 
made the promise that induced reliance.74  If the parent company never made 
the contractual promise that induced reliance, it is generally unfair to punish the 
parent company for breaking that promise if doing so is in the business interest 
of the parent company.75  Accordingly, both promissory and reliance theory 
would support a general rule that shields a parent company from punitive tort 
liability for directing the termination of a subsidiary’s contract.   
However, as with efficiency theory, an exception must be made for parent 
companies who act out of malice or personal animus, rather than to protect the 
business interests of the parent and subsidiary.  If a parent company is acting in 
bad faith and outside of its business interest, respect for the autonomy and 
reliance of the victim of the breach requires that the parent company be 
punished for inducing its subsidiary to breach a contract.76  This exception is 
required by the concern of rights-based theory that parties act in good faith in 
carrying out contractual obligations.77 
 
 
70. See infra Section II.C. 
71. FRIED, supra note 15, at 16. 
72. Id. at 43. 
73. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 56–57. 
74. HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 45 (“[R]eliance theorists accentuate the fairness of redressing 
detrimental reliance on a promise.”). 
75. See id. at 218–20. 
76. See FRIED, supra note 15, at 16. 
77. Id. at 85. 
ERNST - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/17  2:45 PM 
2017] PLURALISM APPLIED 101 
II. THE COURTS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER A PARENT CORPORATION CAN BE 
LIABLE IN TORT FOR TORTIOUSLY INTERFERING WITH THE CONTRACT OF A 
SUBSIDIARY 
A. Category 1: Decisions Formalistically Rejecting Tort Liability (Georgia, 
Michigan, and the Texas Split) 
When a company acquires a subsidiary, it inherits employees, product lines, 
facilities, and it also inherits contracts between the subsidiary company and 
third parties.  In reorganizing the subsidiary company to meet its business 
interests, the parent company may direct the termination of one or more of the 
subsidiary’s contracts.  Whether this is treated as tortious interference with 
contract would rationally depend on the particular circumstances.  Did the 
parent direct the termination for rational reasons to protect the business interest 
of its shareholders?  For example, because an existing requirements contract 
can now be replaced by the parent supplying the goods or because the parent 
can negotiate a better contract for the subsidiary with someone else?  Did the 
parent company terminate the contract in question to squelch competition from 
the victim of the breach?  (Also a legitimate business interest so long as it does 
not run afoul of the antitrust laws.)  Or did the parent direct the termination of 
the contract even though it might harm the business interests of the subsidiary 
or parent, out of personal animus or spite or as part of a scheme to commit 
fraud? 
Unfortunately, whether the parent’s act is punished as a tort depends less 
on these particular circumstances than it does on which body of law happens to 
govern the dispute.  Some companies find themselves in jurisdictions that 
formalistically reject any tort liability for a parent that terminates the contract 
of a subsidiary.78  These Category 1 cases reason that because the parent and 
subsidiary share a unity of interest, the parent is no stranger to the contract and 
can therefore orchestrate its breach without incurring punitive damages.79 
In Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., the plaintiff 
Servo Kinetics (SKI) had a contract with Tokyo Precision Instruments (TSS) 
under which SKI had been distributing TSS electrical valves for over ten years 
in the North American market.80  This relationship ended when Moog, Inc. 
 
78. See Servo Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., 475 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2007); 
Cleveland Reg’l Med. Ctr., L.P. v. Celtic Props., L.C., 323 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. App. 2010); H.S.M. 
Acquisitions, Inc. v. West, 917 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App. 1996); Am. Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Giurintano, 821 
S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App. 1991).  
79. See cases cited supra note 78. 
80. 475 F.3d at 787.  
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acquired a controlling interest in TSS in 2002.81  Roughly ten days after Moog 
acquired TSS, TSS sent a letter to SKI providing notice that it was terminating 
the agreement.82  SKI brought claims against TSS and its parent, Moog, for 
breach of contract and also a claim against Moog for tortious interference with 
contract.83 
In analyzing the breach of contract claims, the Sixth Circuit, applying 
Japanese law, necessarily had to consider whether the contract was breached 
for a “commercially legitimate motive” because the contract stated that the 
contract could not be terminated “without good reason.”84  The court concluded 
that there was a dispute of fact as to whether the contract was terminated for the 
legitimately commercial reason that TSS was in poor financial condition or for 
the perhaps illegitimate motive that Moog did not want SKI to compete with 
Moog in selling valves to the same customers.85  The court further concluded 
that there was a dispute of fact under Michigan law as to whether TSS was a 
“mere instrumentality” of Moog to justify piercing the corporate veil and 
allowing Moog to be liable for any breach of contract by TSS.86  Hence, the 
breach of contract claims were remanded for trial to determine if TSS and its 
parent Moog would be liable for compensatory contract damages.87 
The Sixth Circuit’s treatment of the tortious interference claim was quite 
different.  Applying Michigan law, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of 
the claim on summary judgment because “SKI cannot demonstrate that Moog 
was a third party to the TSS-SKI contract.”88  The court held that under 
Michigan law, tortious interference with contract requires “(1) a contract; (2) a 
breach; and (3) instigation of the breach without justification by the 
defendant.”89  However, the claim could be disposed of without analyzing these 
elements because Michigan law also provides that “tortious interference with 
contract requires proof . . . that the defendant was a ‘third-party’ to the 
contractual relationship.”90  The court concluded as a matter of law that there 
was a “unity of the parties” because Moog completely controlled TSS.91  
 
81. Id. at 788. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 789. 
84. Id. at 790–91. 
85. Id. at 793. 
86. Id. at 799. 
87. Id. at 802. 
88. Id. at 800–01. 
89. Id. at 800. 
90. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Willis v. New World Van Lines, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 
380, 396 (E.D. Mich. 2000)). 
91. Id. at 801. 
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“[T]here was functionally only one corporation, Moog, which could not induce 
a breach in what was in effect its own contract.”92  Hence, Moog could 
terminate the contract for any reason and under any motivation, just as though 
it were a party to the contract.  In disposing of the tortious interference claim, 
the court had no need to consider the factual disputes regarding Moog’s and 
TSS’s motivations that were relevant to whether there was a breach of 
contract.93  Because the parent corporation’s “interests are unified with the 
interests of the controlled corporation,” there could be no tortious interference 
with contract and resultant punitive damages under any circumstances.94   
Georgia apparently has the same black-letter approach as Michigan to this 
question.  In Lyman v. Cellchem, the Georgia Court of Appeals noted that 
“[t]his Court in the past contemplated that, under some circumstances, a parent 
corporation might be a stranger to its subsidiary’s business relations such that 
a claim against the parent for tortious interference could lie.”95  The court 
decided that the Georgia Supreme Court had subsequently “disapproved” of 
this approach by stating in a different context that “all parties to an interwoven 
contractual arrangement [or business relationship] are not liable for tortious 
interference with any of the contracts or business relationships.”96  Although 
the Georgia Supreme Court did not address the particular situation of a parent 
terminating the contract of a subsidiary, the Court of Appeals extended the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning to that situation, holding “that as a matter of law, a 
parent corporation cannot be a stranger to its subsidiaries’ business or 
contractual relations, and that no claim can be sustained against a parent for 
tortious interference with such relations.”97  Applying this bright-line approach, 
the court threw out a jury verdict holding a subsidiary liable for tortiously 
interfering with the contract of its parent corporation.98  The court made plain 
that the subsidiary’s motives in interfering with the contract were irrelevant.99  
Even though it was “clear that Appellants were not blameless in their 
machinations involving Cellchem,” and even though the subsidiary’s action 
constituted a breach of its fiduciary duties, there could be no claim for tortious 
 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 800–01. 
94. Id. 
95. 779 S.E.2d 474, 480 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015) (citing SunAmerica Fin., Inc. v. 260 Peachtree St., 
Inc., 415 S.E.2d 677, 684 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)). 
96. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt. Co. v. McLane, 503 S.E.2d 278, 
283–84 (Ga. 1998)). 
97. Id. (quoting In re Hercules Auto. Prod., Inc., 245 B.R. 903, 910 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1999)). 
98. Id. at 481. 
99. Id. at 479. 
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interference with contract because the subsidiary was no stranger to the contract 
as a matter of law.100 
In Texas, there is a split of authority.  Some divisions of the Texas Court of 
Appeals have adopted this absolute immunity approach, while one opinion has 
adopted the Category 3 approach described below.101  An example of a Texas 
Category 1 case is American Medical International, Inc. v. Giurintano.102  In 
American Medical International, the plaintiff was a hospital administrator who 
alleged, inter alia, that the parent company of the hospital where he was 
employed tortiously interfered with his employment contract.103  The Texas 
Court of Appeals held that this claim should have been dismissed on the 
pleadings because a parent and subsidiary corporation “are so closely aligned 
that it is impossible, as a matter of law, for one to tortiously interfere with the 
other.”104  Hence, although the defendants’ behavior was sufficiently tortious 
to uphold a jury verdict of intentional infliction of emotional distress, there 
could be no liability for tortious interference with contract simply because of 
the parent-subsidiary relationship.105  Other Texas cases apply the same blanket 
rule.106 
In applying this absolute rule, the Texas cases rely heavily on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.107  
In Copperweld, the Court decided that subsidiary and parent corporations are 
incapable of conspiring with one another to violate the Sherman Antitrust Act 
 
100. Id. 
101. See Justin E. Myers, Comment, Sneaking Around the Corporate Veil: Tattooing a Parent 
Corporation with Liability for Tortious Interference with its Subsidiary’s Contract, 35 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 193, 195 (2004) (“In Texas, two schools of thought that argue whether a parent corporation can 
be held liable for tortious interference with its subsidiary’s contractual relations have emerged from 
the courts.  Some courts have indicated that a blanket ban exists on a parent corporation’s liability for 
tortious interference with its subsidiary’s contractual relations.  Other courts have left open the 
possibility of a parent corporation’s liability for tortious interference with its subsidiary’s contractual 
relations.”); see also infra Section II.C (discussing Valores Corporativos, S.A. de C.V. v. McLane Co., 
945 S.W.2d 160, 168 (Tex. App. 1997)).   
102. See 821 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. App. 1991). 
103. Id. at 335. 
104. Id. at 336–37. 
105. Id. at 344. 
106. See, e.g., Cleveland Reg’l Med. Ctr., L.P. v. Celtic Props., L.C., 323 S.W.3d 322, 346 (Tex. 
App. 2010) (“[B]y nature a parent company has a complete identity of financial interest with its wholly 
owned subsidiary and, therefore, as a matter of law cannot tortiously interfere with the contract of its 
wholly owned subsidiary.”); H.S.M. Acquisitions, Inc. v. West, 917 S.W.2d 872, 883 (Tex. App. 1996) 
(“Keystone–PA had been a wholly owned subsidiary of Chester since September 1988.  As such, 
Chester could not have tortiously interfered with Keystone–PA as a matter of law.”). 
107. 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (discussed in Am. Med. Int’l, Inc., 821 S.W.2d at 336; Cleveland Reg’l 
Med. Ctr., L.P., 323 S.W.3d at 347; H.S.M. Acquisitions, Inc., 917 S.W.2d at 882). 
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because they have a unity of interest.108  In this context, the Supreme Court 
reasoned as follows: 
A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete 
unity of interest.  Their objectives are common, not disparate; 
their general corporate actions are guided or determined not by 
two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one.  They are not 
unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the 
control of a single driver.  With or without a formal 
“agreement,” the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent, 
its sole shareholder.109 
This reasoning makes sense in the context of determining whether there is 
conspiracy liability under the Sherman Act.  The parent-subsidiary relationship 
precludes free-market competition between the two companies and their actions 
cannot, therefore, be expected to comply with antitrust policy to preserve 
competition.110  Accordingly, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[i]f a parent 
and a wholly owned subsidiary do ‘agree’ to a course of action, there is no 
sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served different 
interests.”111 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning does not, however, apply to the question of 
whether a parent can commit a tort against a third party by directing its 
subsidiary to breach a contract with that third party.  That question involves 
contract and tort law policy, not competition policy.  Despite a parent 
company’s unity of interest with its subsidiary company, the parent may well 
act tortiously against a third party in a way that does not protect the business 
interests of the parent and subsidiary, even if such behavior would not 
necessarily implicate competition policy.112  Accordingly, the Copperweld 
decision is not controlling or even particularly persuasive authority with respect 
to the issue at hand. 
B. Category 2: Decisions Formalistically Imposing Tort Liability Because 
the Parent and Subsidiary are Technically Separate Entities (The Minority 
Rule) 
The rule of Category 2—that the parent enjoys no immunity from tort 
liability for terminating the contract of a subsidiary—may exist only in theory, 
or perhaps only in Florida. 
 
108. Id. at 771. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 770–71. 
111. Id. at 771. 
112. See infra Section II.C. 
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In Oxford Furniture Companies v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc., the 
Eleventh Circuit, applying Alabama law, affirmed a jury verdict against Masco 
Corporation for its alleged tortious interference with the contract of its wholly 
owned subsidiary, Drexel.113  Drexel had a contract with the plaintiff, Oxford 
Furniture Companies, whereby Oxford was the exclusive dealer of Drexel’s 
furniture.114  When another furniture distributor, McLeod, became upset about 
the exclusive nature of the Oxford contract and threatened litigation, Masco 
advised its subsidiary Drexel that it should continue to distribute through 
McLeod, a decision that Oxford considered a breach of contract.115  The trial 
court found Masco liable for tortious interference with contract and awarded 
Oxford $250,000 in punitive damages on that claim.116   
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit rejected Masco’s claim that it was immune 
from tort liability because Drexel was its wholly owned subsidiary.117  The court 
acknowledged that under Alabama law, “the alleged tortfeasor ‘must be 
independent of, or a third party to,’ the contract at issue.”118  However, 
“Alabama law also recognizes that a parent corporation is a distinct entity from 
its subsidiary and that the parent is not liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless 
the subsidiary is ‘a mere adjunct, instrumentality, or alter ego of the parent 
corporation.’”119  Because of this technical distinction between the two entities, 
and because there was no evidence that Masco was a party to the contract, 
Masco could be liable for tortious interference with contract and the jury verdict 
was affirmed.120  The court did not inquire into Masco’s purpose in interfering 
with the contract, whether it acted out of legitimate business interest, or whether 
its conduct constituted an independent tort.  Rather, the technical separation 
between the parent and the subsidiary meant that the parent was a stranger to 
the contract and was therefore liable in tort for advising its subsidiary to breach 
the contract. 
In Peacock v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., the defendant was 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), General Motor’s wholly 
owned subsidiary responsible for financing GM cars.121  When the plaintiffs’ 
Chevy car dealership went bankrupt, they sued GMAC for tortious interference 
with the contract between the plaintiffs and GM by virtue of GMAC attempting 
 
113. 984 F.2d 1118, 1126 (11th Cir. 1993). 
114. Id. at 1121. 
115. Id. at 1121–22. 
116. Id. at 1122. 
117. Id. at 1126. 
118. Id. (quoting Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So. 2d 1381, 1387–88 (Ala. 1986)). 
119. Id. (quoting Ex parte Baker, 432 So. 2d 1281, 1284 (Ala. 1983)). 
120. Id. 
121. 432 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
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to reclaim and obtain payment for vehicles the plaintiffs had purchased from 
GM.122  The Florida District Court of Appeal held that plaintiffs could proceed 
with their claim, despite the fact that GMAC was nothing more than the wholly 
owned financing arm of GM.123  The court’s reasoning consisted largely of the 
observation that “GMAC is a distinct legal entity, and its being a wholly owned 
subsidiary of GM does not alter that status.”124  The court rejected GMAC’s 
argument that it was privileged to act as it did because it was protecting its 
contractual rights and business interests.125  “GMAC’s privilege to protect its 
contractual interests is not absolute but is instead conditioned upon its 
employing means that are not improper.”126  Accordingly, even if GMAC could 
prove it was acting to protect legitimate business interests, it could still be held 
liable in tort for interfering with the contract of its parent company. 
The rule of Category 2 is plainly a minority rule, with only these two cases 
applying Alabama and Florida law in adopting this approach. It is a highly 
formalistic approach that considers only the technical separation between the 
parent and subsidiary corporation, but fails to consider whether the two entities 
share a unity of interests and whether they are acting to advance their legitimate 
business interests.  As I argue below, this formalistic approach lacks 
justification in either efficiency or rights-based theories of contract law.127 
C. Category 3: Decisions Imposing Tort Liability only if the Parent Fails to 
Act in the Best Interests of the Parent and Subsidiary or Commits an 
Independent Tort (Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, 
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, 
and the Texas Split) 
The plurality approach to this issue adopts a middle ground.  Category 3 
cases hold that a parent company is privileged to terminate the contract of a 
subsidiary if it is acting out of a legitimate business interest and does not 
commit an independent tort.128  In theory, this approach shields efficient 
breaches of contract from punitive liability while also policing tortious conduct. 
 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 143–44. 
126. Id. at 144. 
127. See infra Parts III, IV. 
128. See Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1988); Phil Crowley Steel Corp. 
v. Sharon Steel Corp., 782 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1986); Valores Corporativos, S.A. de C.V. v. McLane 
Co., 945 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App. 1997); WMW Mach. Co. v. Koerber AG, 658 N.Y.S.2d 385 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1997).  
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In WMW Machinery Co. v. Koerber AG, the Appellate Division of the New 
York Supreme Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment dismissing the 
claim for tortious interference brought by WMW Machinery Company 
(WMW) against K.A.K. Holding Co. (KAK).129  WMW claimed that KAK 
tortiously interfered with contracts it had with three KAK subsidiary companies 
to act as the exclusive distributor of defendants’ grinding equipment.130  The 
Appellate Division held that the tortious interference claim was properly 
dismissed because “the parent or a subsidiary of the Manufacturers, have an 
economic interest in the Manufacturers sufficient to support a defense of 
economic justification.”131  The court held that the defendants had a legitimate 
business justification for terminating the contracts, “especially in light of 
WMW’s failure to sell a single machine pursuant to the contracts for over 22 
months.”132  The court stated that “[t]he imposition of liability in spite of a 
defense of economic interest requires a showing of either malice on the one 
hand, or fraudulent or illegal means on the other.”133  The tortious interference 
claim was properly dismissed because WMW “failed to raise a triable issue of 
fact as to whether the defendants were motivated by malice, or employed 
fraudulent or illegal means to terminate the contracts.”134 
The Second Circuit applied this New York rule to reverse a jury verdict of 
tortious interference with contract against Volvo for winding down the 
corporate affairs of its subsidiary, Beijer, Inc., in a way which resulted in the 
termination of Beijer’s contract with the plaintiff, American Protein 
Corporation (American Protein).135  The court held that under New York law, 
“terminating a corporate contract in furtherance of an equally important right 
to act in its own economic interests justifies what would otherwise be 
actionable.”136  The court held that the jury verdict against Volvo and its 
executives failed “as a matter of law,” because “[t]here is no evidence on the 
record before us of malice toward American Protein.”137  Rather, “the evidence 
showed only that Volvo executives on the board of Beijer, Inc. endorsed 
 
129. 658 N.Y.S.2d at 386. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id.  See Koret, Inc. v. Christian Dior, S.A., 554 N.Y.S.2d 867, 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) 
(“Dior–Paris, as the corporate parent, had a right to interfere with the contract of its subsidiary, in order 
to protect its economic interests.”). 
135. Am. Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 62–63 (2d Cir. 1988). 
136. Id. at 63. 
137. Id. 
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terminating Beijer, Inc.’s contract with plaintiff for the legitimate business 
reason that it was losing money.”138 
In short, the Category 3 cases envision a dichotomy whereby the parent’s 
decision to terminate a subsidiary contract might be motivated by legitimate 
business reasons or by an illegitimate, irrational reason such as “malice.”  If the 
parent’s actions are motivated by legitimate business reasons, then there is no 
tort liability unless the actions constitute an independent tort.139 
The Texas courts are split on whether to apply this rule or the absolute 
immunity rule of Category 1.140  In Valores Corporativos, S.A. de C.V. v. 
McLane Co., the San Antonio Division of the Texas Court of Appeals adopted 
the Category 3 rule, deciding “that a parent’s interference with its subsidiary’s 
contractual relations is usually justified, [but] circumstances may arise in which 
the financial interests of neither [the parent nor the subsidiary] motivate the 
interference.”141  The court acknowledged that in adopting this rule, it was 
“declin[ing] to follow our sister courts.”142  Rather than adopting a rule of 
absolute immunity, the court held that “a parent corporation is privileged to 
interfere with its subsidiary’s contractual relations ‘when the contract threatens 
a present economic interest of its wholly owned subsidiary,’ and the parent does 
not ‘employ[] wrongful means or act[] with an improper purpose.’”143  The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted Texas law to arrive at the same 
conclusion, holding that a plaintiff in this situation “cannot recover for tortious 
interference with contract or with business relations if the allegedly interfering 
third party acted to protect his own legitimate interest.”144 
The Category 3 test does not always immunize a parent from tort liability 
for terminating the contract of a subsidiary.  In Phil Crowley Steel Corp. v. 
Sharon Steel Corp., the Eighth Circuit applied Missouri law to affirm a jury 
verdict finding that NFV Company and Sharon Steel tortiously interfered with 
the contracts between their subsidiary company and the plaintiff, Phil Crowley 
Steel Corporation.145  The court found that the parent companies were liable 
 
138. Id. 
139. Examples of potential independent torts include “threats, violence, trespass, defamation, 
misrepresentation of fact, restraint of trade, or any other wrongful act recognized by statute or the 
common law.”  Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., 565 F.3d 417, 428 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying 
Missouri law). 
140. See supra Section II.A (discussing Texas cases applying the rule of Category 1). 
141. 945 S.W.2d 160, 168 (Tex. App. 1997). 
142. Id.; see supra Section II.A. 
143. Valores Corporativos, 945 S.W.2d at 168 (alteration in original) (quoting T.P. Leasing 
Corp. v. Baker Leasing Corp., 732 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Ark. 1987)). 
144. Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183, 1196 (5th Cir. 1985). 
145. 782 F.2d 781, 782 (8th Cir. 1986). 
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because they “did not act to protect an interest of NVF or Sharon that the 
Macomber-Crowley contracts potentially threatened.”146  Rather, the parents 
acted contrary to their interests in the subsidiary in order to assist another 
subsidiary company, Ohio Metal.147  Tort liability was appropriate in this 
situation because “Macomber’s contracts did not threaten any interests of NVF 
and Sharon such as to justify their interference.”148  Where a parent company 
does act in its legitimate commercial interest, however, Missouri law will shield 
it from tort liability for intentional interference with contract.149 
The Rule of Category 3 has been adopted by a plurality of states that have 
confronted this issue.  In addition to New York, Texas, and Missouri, the rule 
has been adopted by courts applying the laws of Alaska,150 Arkansas,151 
 
146. Id. at 784. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. See, e.g., Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., 565 F.3d 417, 428 (8th Cir. 2009) (applying 
Missouri law).  The parent corporation had “a legitimate economic interest” in terminating contracts 
of its subsidiary and did not employ “independently wrongful [means], such as threats, violence, 
trespass, defamation, misrepresentation of fact, restraint of trade, or any other wrongful act recognized 
by statute or the common law,” therefore, the parent was not liable for tortious interference with 
contract.  Id.  
150. Bendix Corp. v. Adams, 610 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980).  The Supreme Court of Alaska held 
that a parent was not liable for tortious interference with the contract of a subsidiary under the rule that 
“where there is a direct financial interest in a contract, the essential question in determining if 
interference is justified is whether the person’s conduct is motivated by a desire to protect his economic 
interest, or whether it is motivated by spite, malice, or some other improper objective.”  Id. at 31.  
151. T.P. Leasing Corp. v. Baker Leasing Corp., 732 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Ark. 1987) (“We think 
the correct rule is that a parent corporation’s privilege permits it to interfere with another’s contractual 
relations when the contract threatens a present economic interest of its wholly owned subsidiary, absent 
clear evidence that the parent employed wrongful means or acted with an improper purpose.”). 
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Connecticut,152 Delaware,153 Illinois,154 Maryland,155 North Carolina,156 
Pennsylvania,157 Tennessee,158 Washington,159 and Wisconsin.160  As I argue 
 
152. Boulevard Assocs. v. Sovereign Hotels, Inc., 72 F.3d 1029, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[A] parent 
company does not engage in tortious conduct when it directs its wholly-owned subsidiary to breach a 
contract that is no longer in the subsidiary’s economic interest to perform.”). 
153. Wallace ex rel. Cencom v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“As for the 
Affiliates and Parents, ‘there can be no non-contractual liability to the affiliated corporation’ for 
tortious interference unless plaintiffs plead and prove that: (1) the Affiliates and Parents were 
‘interfering part[ies],’ and (2) the Affiliates and Parents interfered ‘not to achieve permissible financial 
goals but sought maliciously or in bad faith to injure plaintiffs.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 652 A.2d 578, 591 (Del. Ch. 1994)). 
154. Knickman v. Midland Risk Servs.–Ill., Inc., 700 N.E.2d 458, 462–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) 
(holding that parent company was not liable for tortiously interfering with a subsidiary’s contract where 
the parent acted to protect its interests in the subsidiary); Stevenson v. ITT Harper, Inc., 366 N.E.2d 
561, 571 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that parent company was not liable for inducing the breach of a 
subsidiary contract because the parent’s action “was motivated by reasonable business purposes and 
was the product of neither malice nor bad faith”).  
155. Alexander & Alexander Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., Inc., 650 A.2d 260, 272 (Md. 
1994) (“A parent corporation is generally justified in requiring its subsidiary to modify economic 
arrangements, contractual or otherwise, if those arrangements do not benefit the parent.”). 
156. Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998).  The Fourth 
Circuit applying North Carolina law held that the parent company of a franchisor was immune from 
tort liability for directing the termination of franchise agreements because “parties having an interest 
in the activities of a corporation or the duty to advise or direct such activities should be immune from 
liability for inducing the corporation to breach its contract, assuming their actions are in pursuit of such 
interests or duties.”  Id. at 351. 
157. Green v. Interstate United Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 748 F.2d 827, 831 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying 
Pennsylvania law to hold that a parent company was privileged to interfere with the contract of a 
subsidiary for the proper purpose of preventing the dissipation of corporate resources); Shared 
Commc’ns Servs. of 1800–80 JFK Boulevard, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Props., Inc., 692 A.2d 570, 575 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that parent companies could be liable for tortious interference with contract 
where they were “not acting to protect a ‘legitimate concern’”).  But see Nat’l Data Payment Sys. v. 
Meridian Bank, 212 F.3d 849, 857 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he exact scope of the corporate parent privilege 
is unclear, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet spoken on this issue.”). 
158. Waste Conversion Sys., Inc. v. Greenstone Indus., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 2000) 
(“A parent corporation acting contrary to its wholly-owned subsidiary’s economic interests can be 
considered a third party to its subsidiary’s contractual relationship and can be held liable for tortiously 
interfering with that relationship.”).  The Supreme Court of Tennessee has further held that the 
qualified privileged to interfere with the contract of a subsidiary does not apply when the parent owns 
less than 100% of the subsidiary.  Cambio Health Sols., L.L.C. v. Reardon, 213 S.W.3d 785, 792 (Tenn. 
2006). 
159. Hansen v. Transworld Wireless TV–Spokane, Inc., 44 P.3d 929, 936 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) 
(asserting that parent companies were not liable for tortious interference where they were acting to 
maximize shareholder value). 
160. Allen & O’Hara, Inc. v. Barrett Wrecking, Inc., 898 F.2d 512, 516–17 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(asserting that parent company was not liable for tortious interference with the contract of a subsidiary 
where it acted to protect its business interests). 
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below, this plurality approach is justified by both efficiency theory and rights-
based theories.161 
D. Category 4: Decisions Imposing Tort Liability for “Improper” Behavior 
In California, “the privilege of a parent or subsidiary corporation to 
interfere with the contractual relationship of the other ‘is at most a qualified one 
dependent for its existence upon the circumstances of the case.’”162  California 
provides little protection from tort liability to a parent seeking to terminate the 
contract of a subsidiary because it does not treat the parent-subsidiary 
relationship as a special circumstance in analyzing tortious interference 
claims.163  Rather, California follows the Restatement of Torts sections 
applicable to all defendants to analyze this issue.164  Parent corporations have 
the burden of pleading and proving as an affirmative defense that they are 
privileged to interfere with the contract of a subsidiary.165   
To meet this burden, a parent corporation must prove that it: “(a) does not 
employ improper means, and (b) acts to protect his interest from being 
prejudiced by the relation.”166  This test is derived from Section 769 of the 
Restatement of Torts, which provides that one who has a financial interest in 
the business of a third person does not intentionally interfere with prospective 
business relations if he “does not employ improper means” and “acts to protect 
his interest from being prejudiced.”167  To determine what constitutes improper 
means, Section 769 points to “[t]he predatory means discussed in [Section] 
767.”168  Section 767 is a generally applicable section that provides the 
 
161. See infra Parts III, IV. 
162. GHK Assocs. v. Mayer Group, 274 Cal. Rptr. 168, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Culcal Stylco, Inc. v. Vornado, Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421–422 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1972)). 
163. Id. at 184–85. 
164. Culcal Stylco, Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. at 421 & n.3 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
165. GHK Assocs., 274 Cal. Rptr. at 185.  This is in contradistinction to Category 3 cases, which 
put the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the parent company acted against its economic interest or 
committed an independent tort.  See, e.g., Wallace ex rel. Cencom v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Del. 
Ch. 1999) (“As for the Affiliates and Parents, ‘there can be no non-contractual liability to the affiliated 
corporation’ for tortious interference unless plaintiffs plead and prove that: (1) the Affiliates and 
Parents were ‘interfering part[ies],’ and (2) the Affiliates and Parents interfered ‘not to achieve 
permissible financial goals but sought maliciously or in bad faith to injure plaintiffs.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 652 A.2d 578, 591 (Del. Ch. 1994))). 
166. Asahi Kasei Pharma Corp. v. Actelion Ltd., 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 689, 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) 
(quoting Sade Shoe Co. v. Oschin & Snyder, 209 Cal. Rptr. 124, 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (AM. LAW INST. 1939)). 
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
168. Id. § 769 cmt. e. 
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following seven non-exclusive factors for the court to consider in determining 
whether a party acted improperly in intentionally interfering with a contract: 
(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, 
(b) the actor’s motive, 
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct 
interferes, 
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, 
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of 
the actor  and the contractual interests of the other, 
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the 
 interference and 
(g) the relations between the parties.169   
Only one of these factors takes into account the parent-subsidiary 
relationship (factor (g)), and Category 4 courts caution that “[t]his factor is but 
one of the several factors contained within Section 767.”170 
It is erroneous for California courts to follow these generally applicable 
sections in analyzing the specific situation of a parent’s intentional interference 
with contract.  Section 769 applies to persons who have “an interest in the 
nature of an investment” in the business, such as “[a] part owner of the 
business” or “a partner or stockholder.”171  And Section 767 applies to 
defendants accused of this tort generally.172  Sections 767 and 769 simply do 
not speak to the special circumstance of the parent of a wholly owned subsidiary 
seeking to terminate the contract of a subsidiary.173   
This was the conclusion of the Alaska Supreme Court in holding that it was 
error for the trial court to instruct the jury based on these Restatement Sections 
in a case involving a parent corporation’s decision to terminate the contract of 
a subsidiary.174  The Alaska Supreme Court first stated that Section 769 
unambiguously does not apply to claims of tortious interference with an 
existing contract.175  The court then went on to observe that “the comments and 
bulk of cases citing § 767 deal with torts by competitors and are of little help 
here.”176  This is because  
 
169. Id. § 769 (1979). 
170. Paramount Farms Int’l, L.L.C. v. Ventilex B.V., 2016-Ohio-1150, 61 N.E.3d 702, at ¶ 39 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  
172. See id. § 767. 
173. See id. §§ 767, 769. 
174. Bendix Corp. v. Adams, 610 P.2d 24, 30 (Alaska 1980). 
175. Id. at 29–30.  
176. Id. at 30. 
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 [t]here appears to be a significant distinction, however, 
between the interests of a person in his competitor’s contracts 
and those contracts in which he has some direct financial 
interest.  One who interferes with a competitor’s contracts 
ordinarily has little to lose and much to gain by successfully 
causing a breach of contract.  Encouraging contractual stability 
may require imposing legal liability to stop such behavior 
when it steps beyond limits acceptable to society.  But in a case 
where a person has some direct financial stake in a contract, it 
appears logical that a person’s own economic self-interest 
would discourage causing a breach of contract because there 
would be some personal loss.177 
Accordingly, the plurality of jurisdictions follow the Category 3 rule, and 
hold that a parent is privileged to terminate the contract of a subsidiary without 
incurring punitive liability if it acts in its economic interest and does not commit 
an independent tort.178 
The rule of Category 4 strays from these principles by imposing tort liability 
even in circumstances where a parent acts out of sound business judgment, if 
its actions are deemed to be “improper.”179  Because the definition of improper 
depends on the vague, multi-factored test of Section 767 of the Restatement, 
liability can be based on something less than tortious behavior.180  Category 3 
cases impose tort liability on a parent acting in its business interest only if it 
commits an independent tort, “such as ‘misrepresentations of facts, threats, 
violence, defamation, trespass, restraint of trade, or any other wrongful act 
recognized by statute or common law.’”181  Category 4 cases allow for punitive 
remedies against a parent acting in the business interest of the parent and 
subsidiary if the courts deem its actions merely “improper.” 
A stark example of Category 4 in action is the case of Asahi Kasei Pharma 
Corp. v. Actelion Ltd.182  Actelion was a pharmaceutical company that acquired 
all of the stock in CoTherix, another pharmaceutical company.183  CoTherix had 
an existing joint-development contract with the plaintiff, Asahi, to develop a 
pharmaceutical called Fasudil that would directly compete with Actelion’s 
 
177. Id. 
178. See supra Section II.C. 
179. See supra notes 164–68 and accompanying text.  
180. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
181. Waste Conversion Sys., Inc. v. Greenstone Indus., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 779, 784 (Tenn. 2000). 
182. 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
183. Id. at 693. 
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existing pharmaceutical product, Tracleer.184  On the day that Actelion’s 
acquisition of CoTherix was finalized, it notified Asahi “that it was 
discontinuing development of Fasudil for ‘business and commercial 
reasons.’”185  Asahi sued Actelion and its directors for intentional interference 
with contract and prospective economic advantage and obtained a jury verdict 
for over $500 million dollars in compensatory damages plus punitive damages 
against the directors of Actelion.186  These damages did not include 
compensatory damages for simple breach of contract because breach of contract 
damages had already been awarded to Asahi in an international arbitration.187  
Rather, the remedies awarded to Asahi were to deter and remedy the torts of 
intentional interference with contract and prospective economic advantage.188  
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment against Actelion and its 
directors.189 
Actelion was liable in tort despite the fact that it acted for the indisputable 
business benefit of stopping a joint development relationship to develop 
plaintiff’s drug that was in direct competition with Actelion and its newly 
acquired subsidiary.190  The evidence at trial showed that Actelion terminated 
its newly acquired subsidiary’s contract “because it saw Fasudil as a significant 
threat to its market dominance with Tracleer.”191  Accordingly, under the rule 
of Category 4, Actelion was liable in tort because it employed improper means 
in terminating the contract.  The evidence of improper means did not amount 
to monopolization or other anticompetitive behavior in violation of the antitrust 
laws, and no causes of action were tried to the jury for an independent tort based 
on the decision to breach the contract.192  Rather, it appears the Court of Appeal 
found evidence of improper means to support the jury verdict in the fact that 
Actelion refused to provide Asahi with assurance that the joint development 
agreement would continue in the period of time between the announcement of 
Actelion’s acquisition of CoTherix and the final consummation of the 
merger.193  Nor did Actelion inform Asahi during this period that it had already 
decided to terminate the agreement.194  Accordingly, what would otherwise be 
 
184. Id. at 694–95. 
185. Id. at 696. 
186. Id. at 693. 
187. Id. at 697. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 714. 
190. Id. at 701–05. 
191. Id. at 695. 
192. Id. at 700–01. 
193. Id. at 695–96. 
194. Id. 
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a simple breach of contract sounded in tort simply because Actelion declined 
to announce the breach of contract until after the acquisition of CoTherix was 
finalized. 
Undoubtedly there would have been no tort liability in Asahi if the case had 
been tried in a Category 3 jurisdiction.  The decision by Actelion to terminate 
the contract was made for the sound business reason that Actelion did not want 
its wholly owned subsidiary engaged in a project with a competitor to develop 
a drug in direct competition with Actelion.195  Nor did Asahi attempt to prove 
at trial that Actelion’s action constituted an independent tort or an antitrust 
violation.196  Asahi is a case where a simple breach of contract, that had already 
been compensated in arbitration, was penalized with over $500 million in 
additional damages.  This is the difference between Category 3 and Category 
4. 
It appears that the rule of Category 4 may be followed in two other states.  
In Paramount Farms International v. Ventilex, B.V., the Ohio Court of Appeals 
held that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment dismissing the 
plaintiff’s claim that a parent company intentionally interfered with the contract 
of a subsidiary without considering the multi-factored test set forth in Section 
767 of the Restatement of Torts.197  However, this decision is not reported in 
any official reporter, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Ohio 
law would shield a parent company from tort liability where it acted to protect 
a legitimate commercial interest rather than out of malice.198   
In Hawk Enterprises, Inc. v. Cash America International, Inc., the 
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals similarly held that the trial court could not 
grant summary judgment dismissing such a claim without considering the seven 
factors set forth in Section 767 of the Restatement.199  In doing so, however, the 
court explicitly recognized that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had not 
addressed the issue.200 
 
195. Id. at 693. 
196. Asahi Kasei Pharma Corp., 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 689.  
197. 2016-Ohio-1150, 61 N.E.3d 702, at ¶ 39 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 
(AM. LAW INST. 1979)). 
198. Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharm., Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601–02 (6th Cir. 1988). 
199. 282 P.3d 786, 792–95 (Okla. Civ. App. 2012) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 767 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)). 
200. Id. at 792. 
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III. APPLYING EFFICIENCY THEORY, TORT LIABILITY SHOULD BE INCURRED 
IF THE PARENT CORPORATION FAILS TO ACT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY OR COMMITS AN INDEPENDENT TORT 
Efficiency theory generally addresses problems in contract law by asking 
which solution increases overall social welfare by resulting in the most efficient 
use of resources and an increase in societal wealth and utility.201  “[E]fficiency,” 
Judge Posner writes, “denote[s] that allocation of resources in which value is 
maximized.”202 
According to efficiency theory, contract rules should be selected that are 
efficient in one of two ways.203  A rule (or transaction) is Pareto-superior if it 
makes at least one person better off and no person worse off.204  For example, 
a breach of contract is Pareto-efficient if it makes the breaching party better off 
and the non-breaching party is given whatever gain it expected to achieve if the 
contract had been performed.  Stephen Smith writes that “[t]o determine if a 
rule is Pareto-efficient, it is sufficient to ask if everyone did, or would, agree to 
it.”205 
But because transactions and rules have effects on third parties as well, 
there is a more complicated conception of efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency.206  A rule or transaction is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if its overall 
benefits outweigh its costs—“if the gains made by those who benefit from the 
rule are greater than the losses incurred by anyone who might be harmed by the 
rule.”207  Smith opines that “Pareto-efficiency is favoured as a standard by many 
economists since it does not require the complex (some would say impossible) 
interpersonal comparisons of welfare required to assess Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency.”208 
 
201. SMITH, supra note 7, at 107. 
202. POSNER, supra note 10, at 16. 
203. SMITH, supra note 7, at 110. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 111. 
206. POSNER, supra note 10, at 17. 
207. SMITH, supra note 7, at 110. 
208. Id. at 110–11 (alteration in original).  For an additional explanation of Pareto-efficiency and 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 512–20 (1980). 
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The most well-known insight of efficiency theory is the concept of the 
efficient breach of contract.209  Sometimes it is more economical for a party to 
breach a contract than to complete performance, even if we take into account 
the compensatory damages the breaching party must pay to the non-breaching 
party.210  Posner provides a clear example of this situation: 
Suppose I sign a contract to deliver 100,000 custom-ground 
widgets at 10¢ apiece to A for use in his boiler factory.  After 
I have delivered 10,000, B comes to me, explains that he 
desperately needs 25,000 custom-ground widgets at once since 
otherwise he will be forced to close his pianola factory at great 
cost, and offers me 15¢ apiece for them.  I sell him the widgets 
and as a result do not complete timely delivery to A, causing 
him to lose $1,000 in profits.  Having obtained an additional 
profit of $1,250 on the sale to B, I am better off even after 
reimbursing A for his loss, and B is also better off.  The breach 
is therefore Pareto superior.211 
The reason why the breach is Pareto superior is that the breaching party has 
gained $250 more than it would have gained by performing the original contract 
and A, the non-breaching party, is no worse off because it has been paid its 
expectation of $1,000 in profits.  Indeed, the breach may be Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient because in addition to the $250 of additional profit earned by the 
breaching party, B has obtained 25,000 widgets that it places a higher value on 
than A did, the pianola factory remains open, providing jobs to all of its 
employees and economic activity to society, and the widgets go to the place of 
their highest utility and value.  If we assume that the parties to contracts act 
rationally to maximize wealth or avoid loss, then most breaches of contract are 
likely efficient—done either because performance will result in a loss or less of 
a gain than an alternative contract or no contract at all.212 
The necessary consequence of recognizing that many or most breaches of 
contract are efficient is a conclusion that contract law should not impose 
remedies that punish or deter a breach of contract.  In the words of Robert L. 
Birmingham, “protection of the expectation interest is . . . dictated by 
considerations of economic efficiency, since it encourages optimal reallocation 
of factors of production and goods without causing material instability of 
 
209. See generally POSNER, supra note 10; SMITH, supra note 7; Birmingham, supra note 9. 
210. POSNER, supra note 10, at 151; see SMITH, supra note 7, at 117. 
211. POSNER, supra note 10, at 151. 
212. Id. at 149 (“Most breaches of contract, however, are not opportunistic.  Many are 
involuntary; performance is impossible at a reasonable cost—maybe at any cost . . . .  Other breaches 
are voluntary but, as we are about to see, efficient—which from an economic standpoint is the same 
case as that of an involuntary breach.”). 
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expectations.”213  On the other hand, if parties were punished for a breach of 
contract with supra-compensatory, punitive damages, parties would be forced 
to perform contracts even where performance results in a loss or less profit for 
the breaching party, delivery of the goods or services to a party that values them 
less than another party, and less wealth-maximization and economic activity in 
society as a whole.  To return to the hypothetical described above, if the 
breaching party were forced to perform the original contract with A, A would 
be in the same position as it would had the contract been breached, but the 
breaching party would be $250 poorer, B would lose 25,000 desperately needed 
widgets, and the pianola factory would be shuttered, and all of its employees 
would lose their jobs.  Moreover, the law would bend the widgets to a use 
valued at 10¢ apiece rather than a use valued at 15¢ apiece resulting in a sub-
optimal utility for those widgets.  According to efficiency theory, it is to avoid 
deterring efficient breaches of contract that the standard remedy is expectation 
damages, and not punitive damages.214 
Now to return to the situation of a parent company directing its subsidiary 
to breach a contract: should the law punish the parent for inducing these 
breaches of contract?  At first blush, the answer would appear to be no, never.  
Just as efficiency theory assumes that a simple breach of contract is committed 
for rational reasons to maximize wealth,215 so too must a parent company’s 
inducement of breach be presumed to be motivated by a desire to maximize 
wealth.  If a parent company induces a breach of contract, it will be because 
performance by the subsidiary of the contract will result in less gain or more 
loss than breaching the contract would, even after taking into account the need 
to compensate the non-breaching party for its expectation damages.  
Accordingly, Category 1, complete immunity from tort liability for the parent 
company, would appear to be the approach favored by efficiency theory. 
However, if we are to apply a truly concordant approach, then we must take 
into account the valid critiques of efficiency theory before selecting a rule.  One 
principle critique of efficiency theory is that it is based on the false assumption 
that the breaching party always acts out of rational, self-interest.216  Robert C. 
Ellickson critiques efficiency theory by pointing out “that the assumption of 
rationality exaggerates actual human cognitive capacities, and that, because a 
person’s received utility is unobservable, the assumption of rational utility-
 
213. Birmingham, supra note 9, at 292. 
214. SMITH, supra note 7, at 418. 
215. Id. at 116–17. 
216. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique 
of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 23 (1989). 
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maximization is strictly nonfalsifiable.”217  Rather than acting out of rational 
self-interest, people often act out of lack of information or the inability to 
process information,218 irrational risk-aversion or risk-attraction,219 malice,220 
revenge,221 or a host of other human frailties.222  Posner himself writes that 
“[p]eople are not always rational . . . [a]nd there are situations in which rational 
choice is precluded by uncertainty, defined as noncalculable risk.”223 
In response to this criticism of efficiency theory that it falsely assumes 
rational behavior, Posner writes, “[i]t is important to bear in mind that an 
assumption is not a finding.”224  Elsewhere, Posner explains that theory 
necessarily proceeds with simplifications and abstractions: “[A]n economic 
theory of law is certain not to capture the full complexity, richness, and 
confusion of the phenomena—criminal activity or whatever—that it seeks to 
illuminate.  That lack of realism does not invalidate the theory; it is, indeed, the 
essential precondition of a theory.”225   
Nonetheless, in selecting from among several legal rules, why not select the 
rule that takes account of the possibility of a false assumption, rather than the 
rule that is premised on the artificial simplifications and abstractions of pure 
theory.  This reasoning would advocate for Category 3, which allows for the 
possibility that the parent acts against good business judgment, as opposed to 
Category 1, which assumes that the parent company always acts rationally to 
induce only efficient breaches of contract.  Posner goes on to argue that “a 
theory cannot be overturned by pointing out its defects or limitations but only 
by proposing a more inclusive, more powerful, and above all more useful 
theory.”226  This is the very goal of the concordant theory of applied pluralism, 
 
217. Id. 
218. Id. (“The model assumes that a person can perfectly process available information about 
alternative courses of action, and can rank possible outcomes in order of expected utility.”). 
219. Cf. Ernst, supra note 66, at 469–70 (“[T]he settlement of litigation is not characterized by 
rationality.”) (citing Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 113, 114–19, 124–25, 145 (1996) (discussing the role of risk-aversion and risk-attraction in 
settling litigation)). 
220. Holmes, supra note 51, at 471. 
221. Kate Zernike, Jurors Convict 2 Christie Allies in Lane Closings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2016, 
at A1 (reporting conviction of former aides, to New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, of all charges 
resulting from the closing of the George Washington Bridge as punishment against a “mayor who 
declined to endorse the governor’s re-election”). 
222. See Jon Elster, Some Unresolved Problems in the Theory of Rational Behavior, 36 ACTA 
SOCIOLOGICA 179, 179 (1993). 
223. POSNER, supra note 10, at 4. 
224. Id. 
225. Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 774 (1975). 
226. Id. 
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which attempts to select the rule that takes into account multiple theories and 
the critiques of those theories. 
A more convincing answer to the argument that efficiency theory is 
premised on a false assumption of rationality is that, whereas individuals may 
act out of irrational disregard for self-interest, business firms are far more likely 
to act rationally.  Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott write that “[t]hese 
objections [to efficiency theory] would be troublesome for an efficiency 
approach that covered all contract types.”227  However, Schwartz and Scott 
argue “that they have little force when [firm to firm] contracts alone are 
considered.”228  Schwartz and Scott reason as follows: 
A firm is directed by its owners, who often are shareholders.  
Shareholders prefer their firms to maximize profits, which the 
shareholders then can consume or save. . . . No one doubts that 
managers sometimes successfully sabotage owners.  For two 
reasons, however, we will assume that managers obey 
shareholder instructions.  First, managers sabotage 
shareholders either by diverting corporate wealth to 
themselves or by failing to take appropriate risks on behalf of 
the firm.  Managers, however, have no incentive to degrade the 
quality of the contracts that they write; after all, these contracts 
create the wealth that the managers later can divert.  Second, 
the legal rules that attempt to deter bad manager behavior fall 
in the domains of the criminal, corporate, and securities laws.  
Contract law should exploit this specialization by assuming 
that the agreements it regulates reflect the parties’ maximizing 
choices.229 
Hence, Schwartz and Scott reason that presuming economic rationality by 
business firms keeps contract law within its boundaries.230  To the extent there 
is “bad manager behavior,” that will fall within the realm of other areas of law 
to police.231  This reasoning would tend to support the aspect of the Category 3 
rule that there should be no tort liability for a parent inducing a breach of 
contract unless the conduct constitutes an independent tort.  If the conduct is 
independently tortious, then the behavior is beyond the realm of contract law 
and should be punished as a tort, according to Schwartz and Scott’s boundary 
theory.232 
 
227. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 7, at 545. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 550–51. 
230. Id. at 545, 551. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 545. 
ERNST - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/17  2:45 PM 
122 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:87 
Schwartz and Scott go on to justify efficiency theory’s assumption of 
rationality in the context of firm-to-firm contracts as follows: 
[T]he pressure to survive promotes competence.  This pressure 
takes two forms.  First, firms that systematically make bad 
economic decisions lose out in competition with profit-
maximizing firms.  Hence, surviving firms are generally the 
ones that can do what they set out to do.  Second, employees 
who systematically make bad economic decisions are unlikely 
to be promoted to positions of responsibility.  Hence, senior 
managers can generally do what they set out to do.  This is not 
to say that all firms all the time pursue profit-maximizing 
strategies.  But it is to say that owners and the market put 
systematic pressure on firms to behave optimally; hence, it is a 
plausible working assumption that firms rationally pursue the 
objective of maximizing profits.233 
Hence, according to efficiency theory, we can generally presume that in the 
context of firm-to-firm contracts (like those that are the subject of this Article), 
parent companies will act rationally and efficiently in their business interest in 
determining whether to induce a breach of contract.  Accordingly, as a general 
rule such breaches should not be punished unless they are independently 
tortious.  Otherwise, the law will deter and punish efficient breaches of contract. 
However, even Schwartz and Scott acknowledge that rational firm behavior 
is not always the case.  They write, “[t]his is not to say that all firms all the time 
pursue profit-maximizing strategies.”234  Other defenders of the rationality 
assumption also acknowledge that companies do not always act out of rational 
self-interest.235  Stephen A. Smith agrees with Schwartz and Scott that 
companies are more likely to act out of rational economic interest because they 
“are required by corporate statute to act for profit.  And even if they were not 
so required, they would likely go out of business if they failed to act in a self-
interested rational manner.”236  But Smith goes on to acknowledge that 
 [t]he second, more important reason that the unrealistic 
assumptions objection is not fatal to efficiency theories of 
contract law is that efficiency theories do not require that 
everyone, or even the majority of people, act in a rational, self-
interested fashion.  It is enough that a significant number of 
people act in this way.237 
 
233. Id. at 551. 
234. Id. 
235. See SMITH, supra note 7, at 126–27; Coleman, supra note 208, at 523; Elster, supra note 
222, at 179; Feinman, supra note 65, at 52. 
236. SMITH, supra note 7, at 126–27. 
237. Id. at 127. 
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Hence, efficiency theory applied in this context would be based on the 
premise that when a parent company induces the breach of a subsidiary 
company’s contract, it will usually do so for rational business reasons.  But 
sometimes it will not.  And when the parent’s behavior constitutes an 
independent tort, then it exceeds the boundaries of contract law and should be 
governed by the punitive policies of tort.  And in those rare situations when a 
parent company acts not to maximize corporate assets but out of malice, 
oppression or some other irrational motive, then it is not inducing an efficient 
breach of contract and such behavior should also be punished and deterred. 
All of this argues for the Rule of Category 3, which shields a parent 
company from tort liability for inducing a subsidiary to breach a contract, 
except when its conduct constitutes an independent tort or is not justified by 
rational, business reasons.238  Such a rule protects the large number of 
presumably efficient breaches of contract while acknowledging the possibility 
that sometimes even private companies fail to act for rational, business reasons.  
The Rule of Category 1 fails to take this possibility into account by granting the 
parent complete immunity from tort liability.239  The Rule of Category 2 deters 
and punishes all breaches of contract, efficient or otherwise.240  The Rule of 
Category 4 punishes many breaches of contracts that the parent induces for 
legitimate business reasons, simply because the conduct is adjudged wrongful 
in a way that can be less than tortious.241 
Another critique of efficiency theory is that it is not grounded in morality 
because it fails to take into account individual rights.242  Efficiency theory 
sacrifices the interests of the individual parties to the contract in the name of 
the overall maximization of wealth and utility in society.243  As Posner writes, 
“by aggregating utility across persons, utilitarianism treats people as cells in the 
overall social organism rather than as individuals.”244  In the context of the 
particular issue at hand, imposing no punishment on parents to deter them from 
inducing subsidiaries to breach contracts disregards the right of the non-
breaching party to the contract to make an enforceable contract and see it 
performed.  One answer to this is that the non-breaching party is sufficiently 
compensated by receiving its full expectation damages under the contract.245  
 
238. See supra Section II.C. 
239. See supra Section II.A. 
240. See supra Section II.B. 
241. See supra Section II.D. 
242. SMITH, supra note 7, at 129. 
243. Id. 
244. POSNER, supra note 10, at 16. 
245. SMITH, supra note 7, at 118. 
ERNST - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/17  2:45 PM 
124 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [101:87 
Another answer to address this is to argue that the overall benefit to society of 
increased wealth and utility outweighs the individual interest of the non-
breaching party to see the contract performed.246  But neither of these answers 
suffice when the parent company acts, not out of efficient, economic business 
interest, but out of malice to harm the non-breaching party or commits an 
independent tort.  Hence, once again Category 3, which imposes punishment 
under such circumstances, is the best rule.  Moreover, the advantage of the 
concordant approach to selecting contract rules is that we can now apply 
individual rights-based theory to the problem at hand, to see if the rule we have 
selected adequately safeguards individual rights. 
IV.  APPLYING RIGHTS-BASED THEORY, TORT LIABILITY SHOULD BE 
INCURRED IF THE PARENT CORPORATION FAILS TO ACT IN THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY OR COMMITS AN INDEPENDENT 
TORT 
One cannot and should not rest solely on utilitarian theories (such as 
efficiency theory) to select the best contract rule to govern a particular situation.  
Courts, which are charged with meting out justice to the individual parties 
before them, presumably do not focus solely or even primarily on the interests 
of society at large.  Rather, as Fuller and Perdue observe, “it is impossible to 
assume that when a court enforces a promise it necessarily pursues only one 
purpose and protects one ‘interest.’”247  When one is confronted with a palette 
of potential rules, the best rule is the rule that serves both societal interests and 
protects the rights of the parties.  Hence, having determined that efficiency 
theory favors a rule holding a parent company immune from tort liability for 
inducing a subsidiary to breach a contract, except when the parent acts without 
regard to rational business interest or commits an independent tort, we now 
consider whether rights-based theories of contract support the same rule. 
Rights-based theories explain and advocate for contract rules that uphold 
the individual rights of the parties to a contract.248  A foundational component 
of individual liberty is the freedom to order one’s own affairs on one’s own 
terms through the making of private contracts.249  In order to protect this 
freedom of contract, the promises enshrined in contracts must be enforceable.250  
 
246. Id. at 126. 
247. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 66. 
248. SMITH, supra note 7, at 107. 
249. HILLMAN, supra note 8, at 9 (citing Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL 
L.Q. 365, 366 (1921); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 457 (1909)). 
250. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”). 
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The promissory theory of contract, most eloquently articulated by Charles 
Fried, urges that “respect for others as free and rational requires taking seriously 
their capacity to determine their own values.”251  Fried argues that we enforce 
contractual promises because “holding people to their obligations is a way of 
taking them seriously.”252  Moreover, having invoked the social and legal 
conventions of private contracts, which are designed to protect our individual 
liberties, the parties to a contract have a moral obligation either to keep their 
promises or pay compensation for breaking them.253 
Does this moral obligation to honor promises apply to a parent company 
who inherits the contracts of a subsidiary it acquires?  Freedom of contract 
requires that we only enforce promises that are voluntarily undertaken and 
accepted.254  Charles Fried explains that “[t]he need for acceptance shows the 
moral relation of promising to be voluntary on both sides.”255  As Randy Barnett 
phrases it, “enforcement is not morally justified without a genuine commitment 
by the person who is to be subjected to a legal sanction.”256  One might argue 
that there is no moral justification for holding a parent company to a contractual 
promise it never made in the first place.  But even in the case where a parent 
acquires a subsidiary after the subsidiary entered into the contract in question, 
the parent company presumably had a full opportunity to discover and examine 
the subsidiary’s existing contractual obligations.  In voluntarily acquiring the 
subsidiary, the parent company voluntarily inherited the subsidiary’s 
contractual promises, and liberty does not suffer if we hold the parent to those 
promises. 
Moreover, an alternative rights-based theory of contract, the reliance 
theory, also demands that the parent be held to the contractual promises of its 
subsidiary.  The reliance theory posits that contract rules are explained and 
justified by the need to protect the party who has relied to its detriment on the 
promises enshrined in contracts.257  There is a pressing moral case for protecting 
a party that has relied on the institution of a binding contract to incur expenses 
and forego alternative business opportunities.  As Fuller and Perdue write, 
“[T]he promisee who has actually relied on the promise, even though he may 
not thereby have enriched the promisor, certainly presents a more pressing case 
 
251. FRIED, supra note 15, at 20. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 16 (“An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally 
invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect the 
promised performance.”) 
254. Id. at 43. 
255. Id. 
256. Barnett, supra note 7, at 272. 
257. Id. at 274. 
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for relief than the promisee who merely demands satisfaction for his 
disappointment in not getting what was promised him.”258  If we are to apply a 
truly concordant approach, we have to consider reliance theory in addition to 
promissory theory.  Where a parent has acquired a subsidiary corporation, 
parties who have contracts with the subsidiary corporation face the danger that 
their reliance interests will be frustrated should the parent decide to terminate 
those contracts.259  Those reliance interests must be protected, not only to 
protect the individual interests of the non-breaching party, but because we want 
to facilitate a system whereby businesses can rationally rely on private contracts 
to make investments, plan, and order their affairs.260 
Accordingly, a parent company should be bound to the contracts of its 
subsidiary to the same extent as its subsidiary is bound to those contracts—but 
not to a greater extent.  Particularly because the parent never made the 
contractual promises in the first place, and never induced the reliance that 
resulted from those promises, it would be a perverse set of rules that punished 
the parent more severely for inducing a breach of contract than it punished the 
subsidiary who actually entered into the contract.  Under both promissory and 
reliance theories of contract, the proper measure of damages is compensatory 
damages, not punitive damages. 
The “normal” measure of damages for breach of contract is expectation 
damages under both reliance theory and promissory theory.  The need to protect 
against reliance injury results in an award of expectation damages because 
expectation encompasses reliance injury in two distinct ways.261  First, if one 
expects to make a profit under a contract, that necessarily includes “(1) 
reimbursement for what has been done, and (2) a profit in addition.”262  Hence, 
expectation damages compensate for the reliance damages resulting from “what 
has been done.”  But there is another type of reliance harm which is not 
compensated by only reimbursing for “what has been done”: in reliance on the 
contract, the promisee may forego other business opportunities.  “Hence, the 
reliance interest must be interpreted as at least potentially covering ‘gains 
prevented’ as well as ‘losses caused.’”263  But opportunities lost and gains 
prevented are difficult to prove and quantify, and so, according to Fuller and 
Perdue, the law awards expectation damages as a “prophylaxis” against such 
 
258. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 56. 
259. See supra Section II.A. 
260. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 5, at 62 (referring to “the need for facilitating reliance on 
business agreements”). 
261. Id. at 74. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 55. 
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harm.264  The expectation damages award “is a cure for these losses in the sense 
that it offers the measure of recovery most likely to reimburse the plaintiff for 
the (often very numerous and very difficult to prove) individual acts and 
forbearances which make up his total reliance on the contract.”265  In addition 
to protecting this interest, the availability of expectation damages encourage 
businesses to rely on the enforceability of private contracts in making 
investments.266  Hence, expectation damages are the preferred remedy even for 
a reliance theorist for two reasons: “(1) [T]he need for curing and preventing 
the harms occasioned by reliance, and (2) . . . the need for facilitating reliance 
on business agreements.”267 
Promissory theory also embraces compensatory damages (and in particular 
expectation damages) as a limit on damages for breach of contract.  The moral 
obligation to keep a contractual promise means that the promisor should either 
perform the contract or “hand over the equivalent of the promised 
performance.”268  Fried writes that expectation damages are appropriate 
because “[t]he expectation standard gives the victim of a breach no more or less 
than he would have had had there been no breach—in other words, he gets the 
benefit of his bargain.”269   
But if there is a moral obligation to keep a contractual promise, why not 
punish a breach of contract with punitive damages, as we punish torts such as 
fraud and misrepresentation?  According to promissory theory, the reason 
breaches are not punished is that a contract represents a dual promise.  
Contemporary promissory theorists Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz write 
that a contract is a promise “either to trade goods or services to buyers or to 
make a monetary transfer to buyers, equal to the value the buyers would realize 
from receiving the goods or services [i.e., an expectation value].”270  This 
concept of the dual promise has long been enshrined in our law.  Oliver Wendell 
Holmes wrote in the nineteenth century that “[t]he duty to keep a contract at 
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep 
it,—and nothing else.”271  If punitive damages beyond such compensation are 
awarded for breach of contract, it violates freedom of contract by imposing on 
parties something far beyond what they bargained for.272  Markowitz and 
 
264. Id. at 60–61. 
265. Id. at 60.  
266. Id. at 61–62. 
267. Id. at 62. 
268. FRIED, supra note 15, at 17. 
269. Id. (emphasis added). 
270. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 808. 
271. Holmes, supra note 51, at 462. 
272. See id. 
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Schwartz add, “Because dual performance contracts leave the contracting 
parties in control of the substance of their obligations, and, in particular, 
because they do not impose any obligations that the parties did not agree to ex 
ante, they better respect freedom of contract.”273 
Hence, under a rights-based theory, a parent company who inherits the 
contracts of a newly acquired subsidiary should not be punished with tort 
liability for terminating those contracts.  The parent company inherits the 
responsibility for respecting the non-breaching party’s reliance interest in the 
existing contract, and so must pay compensation if it breaches the contract.  The 
parent company, moreover, voluntarily inherits the moral obligation to keep the 
dual promise enshrined in its subsidiary’s contract: either to see that the contract 
is performed or pay compensation.  But it would violate the freedom of contract 
of the parent company if it were further punished for directing the termination 
of subsidiary contracts, particularly where the parent never made the promise 
or induced the reliance in the first place. 
Accordingly, applying rights-based theory, the rule of Category 3 is again 
the best rule to govern when a parent company should be liable in tort for 
inducing the breach of a subsidiary contract.  Parents should be immune from 
tort liability unless they act out of malice and bad faith or commit an 
independent tort.  The imposition of tort liability for terminations undertaken 
not for good faith business reasons, finds its justification in rights-based 
contract theory’s emphasis on good faith in the performance of a contract.274  
Respect for the institution of private contract as an institution that guards 
individual liberty requires that society “condemn chicanery and sharp practice 
in the carrying out of contractual obligations.”275  A parent company that 
voluntarily inherits a subsidiary contract also inherits the obligation to perform 
that contract in good faith.  Under the dual-performance conception of a 
contract, this means that the parent has an obligation either to perform the 
contract or to terminate it for good faith reasons and pay compensation.  A 
termination undertaken for malice and oppression violates this duty and society 
can rightfully punish it.  And if the termination of the contract constitutes an 
independent tort such as fraud, then we have left the realm of contract law and 
entered the realm of torts, in which society has a legitimate interest in punishing 
and deterring such behavior. 
 
273. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 811. 
274. FRIED, supra note 15, at 88. 
275. Id. at 85. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The practical task of selecting among legal rules requires that we first 
acknowledge that no single normative theory can explain or justify a social and 
legal institution as old and complicated as contracts.  A pluralist society 
demands a pluralist approach to selecting contract rules.  Under this concordant 
approach, any rule we select should be justified by both utilitarian theories, 
because it recognizes the interests of society, and by rights-based theories, 
because it does justice to the individual parties to the contract.  In this Article I 
have attempted to demonstrate that such a concordant approach to normative 
contract theory is possible by addressing the problem of whether and when a 
parent company should be held liable in tort for directing the breach of a 
subsidiary’s contract.  Under both the dominant utilitarian theory of our time 
(efficiency theory), and the dominant rights-based theories of our time 
(promissory and reliance theories), a parent should be held liable in tort for 
intentional interference with a subsidiary contract only where it fails to act for 
rational business reasons or where it commits an independent tort. 
